Tuesday, September 25, 2018
Monday, September 3, 2018
Here early in the 21st Century with all of its rapid technological advances and scientific discoveries, we are encountering the primitive responses of bigotry, racism,miscegenation,
nationalism, and ethnocentrism based on
scientifically discredited biological assumption and justification.
When Charles Darwin published his ORIGIN OF SPECIES in 1859, he upset the prevailingWestern European world view about the Biblical creation and mankind's role in it. The first three chapters of the Old Testament's Book of Genesis was, and is, for many even today, the complete answer to who we are and how the world works. Central to the Genesis story is the special place Adam and Eve play in the history of humankind. It relates back to the idea that only the descendents of this couple are God's creation of humanity. And this raises the question of who are those other people, or are they people?
Anthropology, or proto-anthropology, arose and has struggled with this conflict between the Biblical creation and the scientific discoveries and theories that the Darwinian revolution has caused. Today we can point to hard physical evidence of the role chromosomes and gene sequences in DNA play in the phenotypes of individuals -- human and otherwise. Go on TV and you can find ads for having your DNA analyzed and a profile of your ethnic/genetic heritage drawn for you.
Despite this, or maybe because of it, may people feel threatened by the idea that humankind are all related, all part of the same species. From the most sophisticated intellectual to the most primitive of persons in the Amazon forest or New Guinea highlands, we are all part of the same family of God created, or better, emergent creatures. Anthropologist in the 19th Century struggled with the question and split along a number of lines. There were those who favored a more biblical interpretation of human origins, others who accepted a Darwinian explanation for a biological evolution but restricted in timing and to particular, especially Northern European, "races." Still others sought differences in a different place -- in the evolution of Culture.
Social Darwinism sought to explain the differences between peoples and populations based on the differential evolution of culture by different 'race' groups. For Anthropology, this division was most prominent in the formation of the American Anthropological Association where physical anthropology and cultural anthropology competed intellectually over the basic question of "nature" vs "nurture".
Based on the statistical studies of Francis Galton in 1883. Galton, ironically was a cousin of Charles Darwin. The gross physical differences (phenotypes) that could be observed in different populations were assumed to represented different levels of intellectual evolution. Therefore,one could postulate that differences in cultural development as evidence for their evolutionary and biological position in the human species. Some physical anthropology argued that humans, as animals, evolved in a similar way to all species and could be bred in the same way other domesticated animals are bred. Arising out this was a theory of eugenics.
On the other hand, cultural anthropologists would argue that cultural differences arose from different historical and environmental challenges that different human populations faced and adapted to overtime. History, expressed as cultural differences, was more important in explaining human variation than the inheritance of biological differences This culturally relative position was argued by Franz Boas and his students.
The eugenics movement led to the formation of the Galton Society. The role of Madison Grant in promoting a racial based philosophy is found in his writings such as The Passing of the Great Race which Hitler called his Bible. A number of physical anthropologist joined this group in the early days of the 20th Century. The movement appeared to have died within anthropology in the 1930's and a viable scientific idea by the end of WWII. In many respects, it was and has become one of anthropology's great mistakes.
Today, with modern medicine, genetic engineering, boutique babies, commercial DNA services, the alienation and tribalism in our politics here in the US and around the world, some are suggesting that by seizing political power is the way toward "racial" purity. These groups if they achieve their political goals, can and will use those technologies to achieve their eugenic objectives. Modern science is giving extremists the false hope that by simply seizing political apparatus they may further their eugenic goals with the new technologies.
Will anthropologists stand up against such an ideology? Can a strong valid anthropological argument be made that separates the difference between "race" as a dangerous cultural belief system and "race" as a false biological concept?
Does Robert Lowie's observation hold when the biological constant becomes a cultural variable?
Since biological change occurs slowly and cultural changes occur in every generation, it is futile to try to explain the fleeting phenomena of culture by a racial constant. We can often explain them—in terms of contact with other peoples, of individual genius, of geography—but not by racial differences.
These concerns have a long history which began with a very simple question that came up when, as an undergraduate in the early 1960s, I read "Nomads of the Long Bow", Allen Holmberg's dissertation about his research among a very "primitive" band living in the Amazon region of Bolivia. At one point he tells of an experiment he conducted.
My question, at the time, was "What happened to the shotgun when Holmberg left, or when Tibaera ran out of shotgun shells?One case deserves special mention. Enia (Knee) was the brother-in-law of Chief Eantandu. He had had some contact with the outside, but because of maltreatment had run away from his patron and returned to native life. He was an intelligent man with an unusual ability (for a Siriono) to adjust to white civilization. He was a hard worker and reliable, and he knew consider- able Spanish. His one weakness was that he could not hunt as well as his countrymen. Time after time I saw him leave with his bow and arrows, and time after time I watched him return empty-handed, while his fellow tribesmen left after him on the same trail and returned with game. He was generally referred to as "not knowing how to hunt." He was openly insulted at drinking feasts for his inability to hunt. He had lost at least one wife to better men. His status was low; his anxiety about hunting, high. He had, however, made some kind of readjustment to native life by planting more crops and collecting more forest products than the others and trading some of his vegetable products for meat. But still he was not satisfied. Noting this condition, I set out to raise his status. First he accompanied me with his bow and arrows on hunting trips. He carried in game which I shot, part of which was given to him and which we told others was shot by him. His status began to improve. Shortly thereafter I taught him to use a shotgun, and he brought in game of his own. Needless to say, when I left Tibaera he was enjoying the highest status, had acquired several new sex partners, and was insulting others, instead of being insulted by them. (Italics added p. 58 )
Maybe a dumb question at the time, "human subjects" was not a real issue in research ethics at the time. But I find myself always returning to it when I consider, "What is our professional responsibility?"
Academic vs Applied Biases
My position has always been as a representative of the applied point of view. As a result of these concerns I actively participated in the discussions of professional ethics and profession as represented by the AAA, SfAA, and NAPA throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This included service on committees and task forces set up by the AAA Ethics Committee to explore and revise the Standards of Professional Responsibility.
As part of my dissertation on the professionalization of anthropology, the history of the ethical movement within the profession became a major issue. One of the discoveries in my research was what the ethical concerns were emotional and there existed a profound ignorance of the implications of such concerns had for the anthropologists and their organizational institutions. Specifically, it centered around the question of "responsibility" vs "taking responsibility." The difference is critical and one we have yet to accept. The former is ideational and based on moral beliefs and biases. "What should you do?" The latter is behavioral and based on social norms of expected and accepted role performance based on social status. "What can you do?"
Since writing my dissertation I have found that the decade of the 1970s was a watershed in the discussion of ethics in anthropology. We still struggle with the issue. y_and_Business
Ethics as Action, not Belief:
I have addressed this issue since then as it relates to applied anthropology and business.
Ethics, as opposed to mortality, is a question of behavior, not principle. How should one behave in a given context? Unlike etiquette, which asks how should one act properly in a given situation, ethics is a question of proper role behavior associated with a socially defined status in a social network/structure. Ethics is based on the reciprocal relationships between statuses within the social matrix that the individual operates. It is a compromise between one's "personal" moral code and the expectations that others have for someone's performance. Ethics are socially defined and sanctioned status. That is, "ethics" implies responsibility for one's action as a social agent.
Professional ethics implies taking on responsibilities for what one professes to be based on the principle beliefs and standards espoused by the institution they represent. It means accepting that you can be and will be held personally accountable for your actions in the role as a "professional" and agent of the institution you represent.
To be professional requires that there is a clear understanding of "who is a professional." The public expects that the "professional institutions" that claim to represent their members will develop a code of conduct (behavior) and enforce such a code. To develop a code of conduct (behavior) in the vacuum of the clear definition of professional status is an exercise in futility. Without the institution taking responsibility for certifying who is and who is not a professional is also futile. Unfortunately this has been the history of the ethical discussion within anthropology throughout the post 1970 period.
Academic Mentality vs Social Reality toward Research
In 1979, and recently revised and published, I attempted to point out the connection between ethics and the law and their implications for the "profession", especially as it refines itself as a research discipline. I did this with a discussion based on US Government's requirements and regulations covering federal support of Human Subjects research at the Workshop on Regulation of Applied Social Research: Legal and Ethical Issues, at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, Philadelphia, PA. (see SfAA reference above).
The Law, in the form of regulations, took the responsibility away from the individual researcher, especially the academic researcher, for determining what was ethical or not in their research. And the government placed it in the hands of Institution for whom the researcher works or is employed. It established the requirement for Informed Consent by the subjects of such research, and it required the establishment of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to over see the evaluation and monitoring of proposals issued by the Institution.
Law represents the social expression of society's morality on the one hand when to defines principles of justice, and ethics when it proscribes the ritual or procedures that are required and expected in achieving justice. Under the regulations described above and under the Law itself, there is considerable individual latitude granted to the institutions and to professions to proscribe policies that define and restrict behavior in specific roles that form the basis of the status of the professional. Where these standards exceed the reasonable authority of the institution, the more general laws of society apply.
What does this have to do with anthropological ethics? A quick look at the "ethics" codes of the SfAA. the AAA, and NAPA point to the aversion these institutions have toward accepting responsibility for their members' actions as professionals. These codes are advisory only. They apply only to dues paying members who achieved their status by paying their annual dues. This allows the dues paying member to publicly present him/herself as an "anthropologist."
Meanwhile the codes address multiple issues associated with the individual's anthropologist's role not necessarily under the control of the academic institution and which may be covered, more effectively, by the regulations and ethics associated with the individual's other roles associated with their other social statuses. For example, the treatment of students is an issue that arises not from being an anthropologist but from being teacher/faculty member and covered by the policies and procedures of the institution and laws under which they are permitted to operate. On human subject research, the role of researcher is defined by the IRB, the federal regulation, and the moral authority that these impose on human subjects research in general. In an applied setting, well, there are no rules except the general and specific criminal and torts law apply to the situation and behavior.
The point here is that if we are to be truly recognized as a profession and discipline, worthy of public recognition and respect, we need to accept the responsibility that come with it. We need to develop a professional ethical structure which focuses on the role we claim to play in society. That role must be tied to the statuses we claim as our specialty within the social matrix in which we operate. We must claim the right and ownership of that specialty and, institutionally, accept the responsibilities that such a claim imposes upon us collectively and individually. Our code must be explicit, required, and enforceable.
How else can we answer the question that I still find myself asking of Holmberg's ghost, for future generations?